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REPRESENTATION OF CLAIMANTS AT
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION

PROCEEDINGS: IDENTIFYING MODELS
AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Maurice Emsellem*

Monica Halas**
Emsellem and Halas posit that claimants need representationat
unemployment compensation proceedings. Evaluating statistical
and survey data, the authorsfind that representationsignificantly
improves a claimant'schance of receivingunemployment compensation. Improved recovery rates, they argue, benefit not only claimants but also society. The authors analyze the factors inducing
employer appeals of compensation awards. They also review the
systemic issues that accompany the provision of representationto
those unable to afford it or to those unfamiliar with the unemployment compensation process. Finally, the authorspresent models of
expanding claimant representation.
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INTRODUCTION

This Article evaluates the need for claimant representation
at unemployment compensation proceedings and the range of
legal protections and organizational models which have developed to expand access for all claimants, especially those least
able to represent themselves. Part I reviews the favorable
impact of representation as reflected by the available data and
the empirical research regarding administrative and judicial
proceedings including, but not limited, to those within the
unemployment program. Part II expands upon the need for
claimant representation, focusing on such factors as the
impact of job loss on the ability of claimants to represent
themselves and the substantive and procedural law demands
of an unemployment benefits case. Part III analyzes the
factors that may promote employer appeals, including the
experience-rating system and the growing industry of thirdparty representatives. Part IV evaluates the systemic legal
issues that affect the claimant's right to a fair hearing. Part
V concludes with a description of model programs which, if
promoted nationally, could expand claimant access to representation.

I. EVALUATING THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
In 1994, claimants and employers filed more than one
million appeals in unemployment cases. 1 Sixty-seven percent
of these cases involved disputes over "misconduct"2 and
1.
Specifically, there were 989,003 lower authority appeals and 178,843 higher
authority appeals. Unemployment Ins. Serv. U.S. Dep't of Labor, Appeals Data (Jan.
23, 1995) [hereinafter Appeals Data] (unpublished data, on file with the University
of Michigan Journalof Law Reform). Thirty-two percent of all initial determinations
were appealed to lower authority hearing tribunals and an additional 16% of cases
were appealed to higher authority tribunals. Id.
2.
All states have enacted provisions disqualifying from unemployment compensation employees who have been discharged for misconduct. See generally 1C Unempl.
Ins. Rep. (CCH) 1970 (providing brief descriptions of state law variations of the
misconduct disqualification). Typically, as described in the leading case on the
subject, misconduct requires a finding that the claimant's conduct evinced a "wanton
disregard of an employer's interests." See Boynton Cab Co. v. Neubeck, 296 N.W. 636,
640 (Wis. 1941).
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"voluntary quit"' disqualifications, thereby focusing on the
fundamental cause of the claimant's separation from work.4 Of
the appeals brought by claimants who challenged an initial
denial of benefits, thirty-one percent of these claims were
reversed at the first level of appeal.5 In addition, fourteen
percent of unfavorable determinations against claimants were
reversed when challenged at the next level, the higher
authority appeals tribunal.' Employers successfully appealed
thirty-four percent of initial determinations to lower authority
tribunals, and of the cases appealed to higher authority
tribunals, nineteen percent were reversed in the employers'
favor.7 This information, which is regularly collected by the
United States Department of Labor, Unemployment Insurance
Service (UIS), highlights the substantial volume of cases
appealed, the nature of the disputes, and perhaps most
importantly, the significant proportion of determinations
overturned when challenged on appeal both by claimants and
their employers.
This data, however, tells only part of the story. The available information that the UIS collects examines neither the
underlying forces influencing the rate of claimant or employer
appeals nor the impact of legal advocate representation on the
rate of recovery for those parties who pursue their appeal
rights. Pursuant to a request by the National Employment
Law Project, Ohio appeals board officials generated data that
produced noteworthy results regarding representation.' For

3.

All states disqualify workers from unemployment compensation if they leave

work voluntarily. See generally 1C Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) 1 1975 (providing brief

descriptions of state law variations of the voluntary quit disqualification). The
majority of states provides that a worker is disqualified if she quits without "good
cause;" many states require that "good cause' be "attributable to the employer." Id.
4.
Appeals Data, supra note 1.
5.
Id.
6.
Id.
7.
Id.
8.
See Memorandum from David F. Kubli, Chief Administrative Hearing Officer,

Ohio Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, to National Employment Law
Project (Feb. 7, 1995) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform). The tabulations, which indicate whether a party was represented and the

outcome on appeal, were generated by forming certain queries for retrieval from the
state's appeal board database. See Memorandum from David F. Kubli, Chief Administrative Hearing Officer, Ohio Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, to Sue
McNeil, National Employment Law Project (Feb. 10, 1995) (on file with the University
of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). Other states that enter data on outcomes and
legal representation into their computer systems can presumably generate similar
tabulations. See id.
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example, in 1994, Ohio employers were represented on appeal
roughly four times as often as claimants.9 When represented,
claimants were successful in forty-five percent of the cases
appealed, up from thirty-four percent when claimants were not
represented. 10 In contrast, the success rate for employers
remained precisely the same, sixty-five percent, whether or
not they were represented." These results are generally
consistent with the findings of a 1979 survey that the National
Commission on Unemployment Compensation conducted. 2 According to the 1979 data, the rate of decisions favorable to
claimants on appeal was thirty-one percent overall, compared
to a forty-five percent success rate among claimants who were
represented on appeal. 3 In the case of employers, the rate of
success decreased from sixty-nine to fifty-four
percent when
14
employers had representation on appeal.
We recognize that there are limitations in the current
data-for example, the undetermined impact on percentages
when legal advocates screen meritorious appeals-and that
these limitations must be considered in evaluating the impact
of representation in unemployment proceedings. 5 Thus, we
propose a more detailed treatment of this issue, a treatment

9.
See Memorandum from David F. Kubli (Feb. 7, 1995), supra note 8 (reporting that claimants were represented in 10% of all appeals while employers were
represented 45% of the time).
10.
See id. When represented by an advocate, claimants had a 32% greater
chance of success on appeal. Id.
11.
Id.
12.
See Murray Rubin, The Appeals System, in 3 UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION:
STUDIES AND RESEARCH 625,628 (National Comm'n on Unemployment Compensation

ed., 1980).
13. Id. (reporting that claimants were represented in seven percent of all cases).
14. Id. (reporting that employers were represented in nine percent of all cases).
The Ohio and national survey results are consistent with data that we received from
individual programs that provide representation services. Recently published
Wisconsin data also supports these findings. For claimant appellants, the likelihood
of success rises 36.8% if both sides have representation and to 47.6% if only the
appellant has a representative. The overall success rate of represented claimant
appellants is 44.2%. Herbert M. Kritzer, The First Thing We Do, Let's Kill All the
Lawyers (or at Least Replace Them?): Lawyers and Nonlawyers as Advocates 65-66
(Spring 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the University of Michigan
Journalof Law Reform).
15.
For a discussion of survey limitations, such as potential success of claims on
appeal or high quality of counsel, see Rubin, supra note 12, at 629. For a presentation
of various analyses designed to assess the impact of representation and yet to control
for such factors as the "winnability" of the case, see William D. Popkin, Effect of
Representationon a Claimant'sSuccess Rate-Three Study Designs, 31 ADMIN. L. REv.
449, 452-60 (1979).
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that builds on the research regarding the impact of representation in other administrative and judicial proceedings. For
example, scholars have developed statistical models to predict
the outcome of a case by applying the expertise of knowledgeable participants in the system, and then by measuring this
prediction against the actual outcome of a case.16 Not surprisingly, in other forms of administrative and judicial proceedings,
studies tend to show that representation has a favorable and
measurable impact on the outcome of a case.' 7 Therefore, while
the data reported here is preliminary, the data is consistent
with the available research and the views of most experienced
observers of the unemployment compensation system that the
representation of claimants indeed plays a significant role in
the recovery of unemployment benefits.
II. THE CASE FOR CLAIMANT REPRESENTATION

A number of factors contribute to the need for claimant
representation at unemployment compensation proceedings.
These factors divide into two main categories: (1) the unique
nature of the employment relationship, and (2) the complex
nature of the unemployment benefits system.

16.

See, e.g., Popkin, supra note 15, at 457-59.

17.
See COMMUNITY TRAINING & RESOURCE CTR. & CITY-WIDE TASK FORCE ON
Hous. COURT, INC., HOUSING COURT, EVICTIONS AND HOMELESSNESS: THE COSTS AND
BENEFITS OF ESTABLISHING A RIGHT TO COUNSEL at iv (1993) (predicting that if counsel

were provided to tenants facing eviction in New York City, the city would save $67
million in annual shelter costs because these people would not be evicted); Anthony
J. Fusco, Jr. et al., Chicago'sEviction Court: A Tenants' Court of No Resort, 17 URB.
L. ANN. 93,114 (1979) ("Outcomes were markedly different, however, between tenants
represented by an attorney and tenants who did not retain counsel."); William D.
Popkin, The Effect ofRepresentationin Nonadversary Proceedings-AStudy of Three
Disability Programs, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 989, 1024-26 (1977) (discovering that
representation of claimants in several different administrative proceedings had a
substantial favorable impact on the outcome of the case); Andrew Scherer, Gideon's
Shelter: The Need to Recognize a Right to Counselfor IndigentDefendants in Eviction
Proceedings,23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 557, 573 (1988) ("Representation by counsel
makes a tremendous, and in many cases determinative, difference.").
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A. The Unique Nature of the Employment Relationship

The concentration of wealth and power in a few hands,'" the
grave disparity of income between chief executive officer and
employee, and the growing inequality in family income create
the contextual reality that informs the employment relationship.' 9 Furthermore, with the decline in union membership and
the lack of protection under the prevailing employment-at-will
doctrines, employers enjoy the upper hand in the distribution
of rights and responsibilities in the employment relationship.
It should come as no surprise, therefore, that this imbalance
of power in the employment relationship spills over to the
unemployment context, where the employer also exercises
considerably more clout than the employee.2 ° Employers
generally bring more resources and a greater understanding
of the unemployment system to the hearing. In contrast,
employees face an emotional and relatively greater financial
impact. In this context, the importance of representation for
claimants cannot be understated. Indeed, policymakers concerned about the just implementation of the unemployment
insurance system have long recognized these issues and the
National Commission on Unemployment Compensation fully
documented them in 1980.21
Employers simply do not stand in the same shoes as claimants with respect to the need for representation. Witnesses for
employers very often include a worker's supervisor, the head

18. See James B. Atleson, Reflections on Labor, Power,and Society, 44 MD. L.
REV. 841, 841-72 (1985) (discussing the concentration of capital and corresponding
weakening of labor).
See generally LAWRENCE MISHEL & JARED BERNSTEIN, ECONOMIC POLICY
19.
INST., THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA 1994-95, at 25-83, 109-201, 237-52 (1994)

(documenting "slow and unequal growth" in family income, wage trends, and the
concentration of wealth).
20.
The fact that employers pay taxes to fund the unemployment trust has impelled employers to exert influence on state legislators, who craft ever more employee
disqualifications. See Marc Baldwin & Richard McHugh, Economic Policy Inst.,
Unprepared for Recession: The Erosion of State Unemployment Insurance Coverage
Fostered by Public Policy in the 1980s, at 8-10 (1991) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with the University of Michigan Journalof Law Reform).
Cf Ken Morris, On Appeal: ClaimantAdvocacy and Full and FairHearings,
21.
in 3 UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION: STUDIES AND RESEARCH, supra note 12, at

665-70 ("This disparity of representation and inequities in the appeals process must
be eliminated by offering claimants qualified representation . . ").
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of the employer's personnel department, or both. Compared to
employees, these individuals may have more education, more
familiarity with the unemployment hearing process, and more
access to company documents. Employers also can require the
attendance of other employees as witnesses. Unrepresented
claimants, on the other hand, probably no longer have access
to company documents, probably do not know how to get them,
and usually find that corroborating witnesses still in the employ of the company are reluctant to testify. They may not
know how to assemble facts in a case or to prepare subpoenas
and cross-examination-elements necessary to an effective
presentation of their claim.2 2
Added to these disadvantages is the impact on the claimant
of losing his employment. It is increasingly recognized that the
loss of one's job has an enormous emotional force on the
discharged worker.23 Such recognition reflects the central role
that employment plays in the lives of men and women, affecting both economic survival as well as psychological well-being.
The distinct stages of the grieving process ensuing from the
loss of a job 24 and the occurrence of an unemployment hearing
within a few months of discharge, often leaves an unemployed
claimant emotionally ill-equipped to enter a hearing alone.2"
If the initial claims taker has denied the claimant unemployment benefits, the claimant may feel that the agency has
already taken a position against her and may thus assume that
the hearing is a futile exercise, not unlike the process of
disputing the merits of the case with the employer.
The fact that the unemployment hearing may very well be
the first time that an unemployed worker has confronted her
boss face-to-face since separation from the job compounds these

22.

See, e.g., Kritzer, supra note 14, at 69-70 (discussing the impact of unfamil-

iarity of the unemployment hearing).
23.
See, e.g., Foley v. Polaroid Corp., 508 N.E.2d 72, 85 (1987) (Liacos, J., concurring and dissenting) ("It is difficult to overstate the importance of the employment
relationship as a focus of [personal] security and standing in our society.").
24.
Thomas Keefe, The Stresses of Unemployment, 29 Soc. WORK 264, 265 (1984)

("Clinical observations of recently unemployed persons seeking help from social service
agencies found grief reactions, anger, guilt, feelings of loss, and a sense of losing a
part of the self. These responses are not unlike feelings of bereavement.").
25.
A survey of studies of the impact of unemployment reveals that job loss
contributes to increased risk of depression, anxiety, and poor mental health. See
Robert D. Caplan et al., Job Seeking, Reemployment, and Mental Health:A Randomized Field Experiment in Coping with Job Loss, 74 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 759,

767-68 (1989) (testing preventive intervention on the ability to obtain reemployment
and cope with setbacks for victims of job loss).
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problems. The claimant may feel intimidated by this confrontation or angry over a perceived wrongful termination; these
feelings can interfere with the claimant's ability to provide
compelling and sufficient evidence to support an award of
benefits. In addition, the individual circumstances of many
claimants create special barriers to their ability to represent
themselves pro se. For example, even with the assistance of an
interpreter, a party who does not speak the language of the
decision maker suffers an extreme disadvantage when the case
rests, as it often does, on credibility determinations. Interpreters who are either untrained in the law or in simultaneous
interpretation skills, or who are not bicultural may not be accurately presenting the claimant's words.26 Language barriers
prove even more significant for claimants in states where
interpreter services are not provided at hearings. Claimants
who are illiterate or have other communication barriers that
interfere with their ability to persuade a fact-finder face
similar problems.27
Finally, the stakes of winning and losing are simply far
greater for the unemployed worker than for her employer.
Generally, an employer will face only the possibility of a
slightly higher experience rating.2" An unemployed worker, on

26.
See SUSAN BERK-SELIGSON, THE BILINGUAL COURTROOM: COURT INTERPRETERS
IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 146-97 (1990); Carlos A. Astiz, But They Don't Speak the
Language:Achieving Quality Control of Translationin Criminal Courts,JUDGES' J.,
Spring 1986, at 32, 33; Williamson B.C. Chang & Manuel U. Araujo, Interpretersfor
the Defense: Due Processfor the Non-English-SpeakingDefendant, 63 CAL. L. REV. 801,
801-02 & n.4 (1975); Glen Craney, Language v. the Law, BARRISTER, Winter 1989-90,
at 20, 22; Beth G. Lindie, Inadequate InterpretingServices in Courts and the Rules
of Admissibility of Testimony on ExtrajudicialInterpretations,48 U. MIAMI L. REV.
399, 415-18 (1993); Juan F. Perea, Hernandez v. New York: Courts, Prosecutors,and
the Fearof Spanish, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 21-40 (1992); Michael B. Shulman, Note,
No Hablo Inglos: CourtInterpretationas a Major Obstacleto Fairnessfor Non-English
Speaking Defendants, 46 VAND. L. REV. 175, 176 (1993); Susan Garland, Hispanic
Court Cases: The Verdict Is All in the Translation, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 7,
1981, at 23.
27.
See Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participationand Subordination
of Poor Tenants' Voices in Legal Process, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 533, 571-73 (1992).
28.
Experience rating is the basis used to determine an employer's financial
obligation to unemployment insurance. Experience rating essentially imposes higher
tax rates on employers who generate more cost to the system. ADVISORY COUNCIL ON
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES:
BENEFITS, FINANCING, COVERAGE 3, 73 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 ACUC REPORT].
Within the rating system, there is significant variation and complexity in the state
laws that specifically delineate the taxes. Id. at 73-84. Admittedly, self-insured
employers face more serious financial consequences than employers who rely on the
unemployment insurance programs run by the government, because self-insured
employers must pay the entire claim. Ironically, we have found that as non-profit
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the other hand, may face the loss of her family's only source
of income. A recent survey of individuals in New York who had
exhausted their Federal Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC) benefits29 revealed that ninety percent had encountered difficulties in meeting expenses, twenty-six percent
were receiving public assistance one year later, and thirty-five
percent were still unemployed because of a tough job market.3"
With new proposed federal restrictions on welfare, food stamps,
job training programs, and other government assistance programs, the receipt of unemployment benefits will become
increasingly important, and more often will become the sole
means of a family's economic survival.3 '

B. The Complex Nature of the Unemployment
Benefits System

Cases involving employment separation issues are legally
complex and very contentious. An administrative hearing
challenging the grant or denial of unemployment benefits can
be as complicated as any other matter for which an individual
seeks legal representation. The proceedings have the same

employers exercise the option to self-insure, and because they generally employ
workers at lower salaries, they are often the most aggressive opponents in unemployment compensation hearings.
29.
Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-164,
105 Stat. 1049 (codified at scattered sections of 5, 20, 26, 42 and 45 U.S.C.).
DIVISION OF RESEARCH AND STATISTICS, NEW YORK DEP'T OF LABOR, A STUDY
30.
OF EMERGENCY UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION (EUC) EXHAUSTEES: FINDINGS ON
THEIR POST-BENEFIT ECONOMIC AND BEHAVIORAL PATTERNS ONE YEAR LATER 4-5
(1994).
31.
See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HRD-93-107, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE: PROGRAM'S ABILITY TO MEET OBJECTIVES JEOPARDIZED, REPORT TO THE
CHAIRMAN, SENATE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE, U.S. SENATE 42 (Sept. 1993) [hereinafter
GAO REPORT] (finding that unemployment benefits have become "more important in
keeping an unemployed worker's family above the poverty line"); see also Heidi I.
Hartmann & Roberta Spalter-Roth, Institute for Women's Policy Research, The Real
Employment Opportunities of Women Participating in AFDC: What the Market Can
Provide, Paper Presented at Women and Welfare Reform Conference 3 (Oct. 23, 1993)
(manuscript available at Brooklyn Law School Library) (positing that approximately
40% of AFDC recipients "package" income by combining welfare and work either
concurrently or sequentially). As a result of the instability of jobs and low earnings
in the secondary labor market, when heads of households are determined ineligible
for unemployment compensation after periods of work, they are forced to rely on
welfare. If time-limited welfare is enacted, however, they perhaps will not even be
eligible for this source of aid.
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elements of a trial and require the traditional lawyering skills
needed in an adversarial context.32 Thus, the hearing requires
prehearing factual investigation and legal research of the
statutory elements; subpoenas of witnesses and documents; the
orderly and logical presentation of a client's story; the examination and cross-examination of witnesses including expert
witnesses; the preparation and submission into evidence of
relevant documents; and the presentation of legal precedents.
Critically, the hearing may be the only opportunity to create
the record that will be reviewed on appeal.33
The trial-like setting requires that claimants be represented
not only in contested two-party hearings, but also in one-party
hearings in which the claimant challenges the agency's interpretation of law. Cases that involve the statutory concepts of
"suitability of work" or "availability for work" similarly provide
challenges to the unrepresented claimant.34 These concepts are
becoming increasingly complex with added federal requirements imposed through "worker profiling"35 and with states'
increased efforts to reduce recipient eligibility through the
imposition of tougher monetary and qualification criteria.36

See Kritzer, supra note 14, at 53, 130; see also Terry Fromson, Enforcing the
32.
"FairHearing"Requirement,in BRIEFING BOOK: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR OVERSIGHT AND REFORM OF THE UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION PROGRAM 2 (Employment
Task Force, National Employment Law Project, Inc. ed., 1994) (stating that claimants
without representation may be denied the opportunity to testify fully or to crossexamine adverse witnesses).
33.
See, e.g., Morris, supra note 21, at 665-66.
34.
See also ADVISORY COUNCIL ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION, DEFINING
FEDERAL AND STATE ROLES IN UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 113-62 (1996) [hereinafter
1996 ACUC REPORT] (examining these issues on appeal); SAUL J. BLAUSTEIN ET AL.,
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES: THE FIRST HALF CENTURY 169,
232 (1993) (defining concept of "suitable work").
Congress required "worker profiling" with the Unemployment Compensation
35.
Amendments of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-152, 107 Stat. 1517 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 503(j) (1994)). Worker profiling entails states referring suitable claimants to
reemployment services and requiring claimants to participate in these services as a
condition of eligibility for unemployment compensation unless there is justifiable
cause for nonparticipation. Id. § 503(a)(10). As worker profiling is a relatively new
statutory requirement and the Department of Labor has not yet promulgated interpretive regulations, claimants who are denied unemployment compensation under this
provision will need the assistance of a representative to challenge whether the
participation requirements were justified and whether there was good cause for failure
to participate.
36.
See GAO REPORT, supra note 31, at 30-35 (finding that states faced with
declining trust funds respond by tightening eligibility and disqualifications, which
results in decreasing unemployment insurance recipient rates); see also Baldwin &
McHugh, supra note 20, at 2, 19 (identifying changes in federal law that contributed
to the 1980s decline in unemployment insurance recipient rates, because these
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The federal enforcement agency that regulates compliance
with federal law, the UIS, takes the position, however, that
claimants receive fair hearings whether or not they have
representation because the proceedings are informal, and the
hearing officers provide assistance to unrepresented parties.3 v
There are at least four problems with this position. First,
although the hearings may seem informal, the proceedings
carry the trappings of a full-blown trial. Although the rules of
evidence do not apply formally, hearsay objections are generally necessary to preserve issues for judicial review. 38 Moreover,
many courts prevent the parties from introducing evidence,
new arguments, or defenses on appeal if these issues were not
raised during the hearing.3 9

changes encouraged states to adopt restrictive unemployment laws and arguing for
new federal standards to compensate for these changes).
37.
For example, in 1989, the American Bar Association sought UIS approval for
a pilot program providing claimants and employers access to adequate representation
in unemployment compensation hearings. AmericanBarAssociationEndorsesProposal
for Reform of Unemployment Compensation System, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 154,
at A-5, A-5 (Aug. 11, 1989). Mary Ann Wyrsch, then and currently the director of the
UIS, asserted that legal representation does not have a significant impact on a
claimant's or an employer's ability to win a case and stated that the claims and
appeals process is "supposed to be clear and accessible to both parties," leaving it up
to hearing officers to ensure this. Id. at A-6.
38.
Cf Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 395, 402 (1971) (finding that, despite
the claimant's objection that the evidence was hearsay, a written report by a licensed
physician who examined the claimant constituted substantial evidence supporting the
decision to deny social security benefits to the claimant, because the claimant failed
to exercise his right to subpoena the reporting physician and thus provide himself
with the opportunity to cross-examine); Goodridge v. Director of Div. of Employment
Sec., 377 N.E.2d 927, 929 & n.2 (Mass. 1978) (declining to decide whether, as a
general rule, uncorroborated hearsay constitutes substantial evidence in state agency
proceedings, but holding that in this case, it did not adequately support the finding).
But see Commonwealth Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review v. Ceja, 427 A.2d
631, 644 (Pa. 1981) (affirming award of benefits to claimant where the referee
improperly advised an uncounseled claimant of her rights, gave her no meaningful
opportunity to challenge hearsay documents, and did not require the employer to
establish the reliability of hearsay that was not reliable on its face).
39.
E.g., Albert v. Municipal Court, 446 N.E.2d 1385, 1387 (Mass. 1983) (holding
that the appellant was not entitled to raise arguments on appeal that he could have,
but did not, raise before the administrative agency); Heitczman v. Unemployment
Compensation Bd. of Review, 638 A.2d 461, 463 n.5 (Pa. Commw. Ct.), appeal denied,
648 A.2d 791 (1994) (finding that the claimant waived the issue of whether his
employer's work policy was unreasonable because he raised it for the first time on appeal); Dehus v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 545 A.2d 434, 436-37
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988) (finding that the claimant waived his right to raise constitutional issue on appeal because he failed to raise it at the "earliest possible opportunity" during administrative proceedings). But see Yanish v. Industrial Comm'n, 558 P.2d
1007, 1009 (Colo. Ct. App. 1976) (holding that the claimant's failure to raise a
procedural objection to a referee did not constitute waiver where the Industrial
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Second, UIS timeliness standards influence the behavior of
hearing officers and their supervisors. At least sixty percent
of all first-level benefit appeals must be decided within thirty
days of the date of appeal.40 The combination of a large number
of appeals, shrinking personnel, and a definitive time standard
exerts pressure on hearing officers to process cases quickly.
This combination of factors may act as a disincentive for hearing officers to take more time to sort out the facts in an unrepresented worker's appeal.
Third, hearing officers are not always in a position to provide
much assistance to claimants,4 ' nor have courts consistently
held that they must do so. 42 The Indiana Supreme Court

Commission, in reviewing the referee's decision, has broad authority to take additional
evidence); Stone v. Department of Employment Sec. Bd. of Review, 572 N.E.2d 412,
416 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991), affd, 602 N.E.2d 808 (1992) (holding that the claimant
properly preserved an objection even though he raised it for the first time on appeal);
Frey v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 446 N.E.2d 1341, 1346 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1983) (holding that the claimant preserved her right to raise the issue of partial
benefits, a matter of law, in her appeal of the referee's finding of fact); Classic
Personnel v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 617 A.2d 66, 69 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1992) (finding no waiver where the Bureau of Unemployment Compensation ruled on preliminary matters without ruling on other issues of which the Bureau
was aware and which affected the claimant's rights); Bender v. Unemployment
Compensation Bd. of Review, 446 A.2d 1004, 1004-05 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1982) (holding
that the claimant did not waive his right to counsel where the referee failed to inform
him of his rights and where the claimant first raised the issue during judicial review);
Shoreline Community College v. Employment Sec. Dep't, 842 P.2d 938, 943 (Wash.
1992) (stating that an issue is not waived, even if raised for first time in a supplemental brief filed after acceptance of review, if consideration of the issue is necessary to
reach a proper decision).
40.
20 C.F.R. § 650.4(b) (1995).
41. See, e.g., Response of Southern Minn. Regional Legal Servs., Inc., St. Paul,
Minn., to NELP Survey of Unemployment Compensation Administration 3 (on file
with the University of Michigan Journalof Law Reform) (stating that hearing officers
"seldom" assist adequately unrepresented claimants and that assistance "varies with
[the] Unemployment Insurance Judge").
The Pennsylvania courts have recognized that although the review examiner
42.
must ensure that relevant evidence is presented by the parties, this duty does not
mean that the review examiner must also assist the unrepresented claimant in
presenting her claim. See, e.g., Vann v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review,
494 A.2d 1081, 1085 (Pa. 1985) (holding that the lower court erred in requiring the
referee to explain that, where the employer has the burden of proof, the claimant is
not required to testify). The Vann court reasoned that "[t]o require the referee to
advise the claimant as to the strength of his case at any point in the hearing because
he is not represented by counsel 'casts the referee in the role of surrogate counsel and
advocate for the claimant.' "Id. The court went on to state that such an advisement
is contrary to reason and goes far beyond the requirement that the referee be
impartial in giving assistance to unrepresented parties. It is ... preferable to
simply recognize, as the Commonwealth Court has previously done, that "any
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addressed the problems which pro se claimants experience in
Berzins v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Security
Division.4" In weighing the impact of the duty imposed upon
a review examiner to insure a full presentation of the case, the
Berzins court acknowledged that this duty may be impaired by
caseload demands." The court noted the inherent difficulty for
a review examiner who conducts several hearings every day to
"immediately grasp the factual nuances particular to each and
every claim and to develop fully the facts relevant thereto. Indeed, our case precedent reveals the frailty of that hope."45 In
particular, cases involving complicated or humiliating factual
issues may simply make it difficult for a review examiner to
assist a pro se claimant. Such difficulty arises, for example, in
cases where the claimant leaves work because of sexual harassment.4" Here, as in many contentious separations, a claimant

layperson choosing to represent himself in a legal proceeding must, to some
reasonable extent, assume the risk that his lack of expertise and legal training
will prove his undoing."
Id. at 1085-86 (citation omitted). Similarly, in Brennan v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 487 A.2d 73 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1985), the court stated:
The referee is not required to become, and should not assume the role of, a
claimant's advocate. The referee need not advise an uncounseled claimant on
specific evidentiary questions or points of law; nor need the referee show any
greater deference to an uncounseled claimant than that afforded a claimant with
an attorney.
Id. at 77 (citations omitted); see also Hudson v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of
Review, 522 A.2d 189, 190 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987) (stating that the referee is not
required to advise a claimant against assisting the employer in meeting its burden
of proof by corroborating the employer's otherwise incompetent evidence).
43.
439 N.E.2d 1121 (Ind. 1982).
44.
Id. at 1124.
45.
Id. Illinois and Massachusetts courts have found an explicit duty on the part
of review examiners. See Meneweather v. Board of Review of the Dep't of Employment
Sec., 621 N.E.2d 22, 25 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (holding that an unrepresented claimant
was denied a full and fair evidentiary hearing where the hearing referee failed to fully
develop the record); McDonald v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., 487 N.E.2d
186, 188 n.4 (Mass. 1986) ("[Aln unrepresented unemployment compensation claimant
is entitled to reasonable assistance from the review examiner in presenting relevant
evidence.'). Yet, in our experience, the claimants in these decisions usually win
reversals only after they retain counsel to press their claims of inadequate assistance
from the review examiner.
46.
The following transcript comes from a hearing in which the claimant did not
have representation and lost her claim on the grounds that her departure over sexual
harassment did not constitute good cause:
Q.
I see. Let me, let me ask you this. Is he that kind of, is kind of an
outgoing man?
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needs the assistance of a representative to draw out the
relevant facts and to make persuasive legal arguments to meet
the statutory elements of her claim.
Concomitantly, reductions in administrative financing of
state unemployment agencies have resulted in shrinking personnel and training budgets.4 7 Taking these constraints into

A.

Yes.

Q.
This Mr. X.? Does he fool a lot with the girls, ah, does he fool with
the girls, and so forth?
A.

Yes, I do think he fools around.

Q.

Pardon?

A.

Yes, I do think he fools around.

Q.
Ya, I mean, well is this like part of his makeup? And, were you
astounded the first time that he ever...
A.

Yes.

Q.

(inaudible) you about two, two months ago?

A.

I was shocked.

Q.
And did you ever hear him talk to other girls, and, in a downgraded
manner, or about sex or anything like that?
A.

He'd tell them to look at that bum, or look at this bum.

Q.

Oh,

A.

You know, comparing girls' bums in the office.

Q.
I see. So, you ah, would you say that you were, that you were kind
of familiar with that type of conversation that he used to (inaudible)
A.

Yes.

Q.
You were familiar with it. That was part of the man's makeup. I see.
I see. Do you think he meant any harm?
Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 26-27, Caldwell (No. SJC-2561). With the assistance
of counsel, the case was later reversed on appeal, and the state high court upheld the
reversal on other grounds. Caldwell v. A-1 Sales, Inc., 434 N.E.2d 174, 176 (Mass.
1982).
47.
See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HRD-89-72BR, UNEMPLOYMENT
INSURANCE: ADMINISTRATIVE FUNDING IS A GROWING PROBLEM FOR STATE PROGRAMS,
BRIEFING REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS 21 (May 1989) (finding that,

because federal funding was less than states' costs, states have increasingly converted
funds for personnel service to nonpersonnel service costs). Some state officials stated
that lack of funds has resulted in inadequate training, warning of service disruption,
and claims processing errors if unemployment rose suddenly. Id. at 33.
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consideration, it is unfair to require the hearing officer to take
on the role of a quasi-representative-a role that is often
impossible to balance with the concurrent obligation of impartiality.
Finally, in rejecting recommendations to increase the opportunity for representation at hearings, the UIS has also based
its decision on the fact that the agency regularly reviews the
quality of hearings and that the agency is in the process of
redesigning quality appraisal methodology.4 8 We have significant concerns, however, that the revised quality measurement
of first-level hearings, as currently proposed, will not protect
claimants adequately. For example, even if quality appraisals
could assure fair hearings in the absence of claimant representation, no quality controls exist for higher-level appeals
under the system.4 9 Furthermore, higher-level appeals are most
commonly based on arguments that the hearing officer's decision is unsupported by substantial evidence or the law.
Evaluating the merits of these appeals requires expertise in
both administrative and unemployment law. By failing to exercise its oversight role in second-level hearings, the quality of
second-level review is left totally to a state's discretion. Even
in first-level hearings, the sporadic post-hearing quality review
cannot substitute for representation.

48.
The U.S. Department of Labor began the Performance Measurement Review
(PMR) project in 1988 "to examine, evaluate, and improve performance measurement"
in the UIS's oversight of state employment security agencies. See Unemployment
Insurance Program Letter No. 13-95, 60 Fed. Reg. 3702 (1995). PMR encompasses
three phases. Phase one consisted of an analysis of existing oversight measures to
determine whether they should be revised. Phase two consisted of a 15-month field
test of the PMR measures in six states and has resulted in an interim evaluation
report by Mathematica Policy Research. Phase three will consist of national implementation of the PMR measures. Id. The fact that the PMR project is still in progress
should afford interested parties the opportunity to influence the design of the project.
See also William S. Borden & Walter S. Corson, Mathematica Policy Research, Performance Measurement Review Interim Evaluation Report (MRP Ref. No. 8112-104, Dec.
5, 1994) (on file with the University of MichiganJournalofLaw Reform) (accompanying the Unemployment Insurance Program Letter and evaluating the PMR field test).
49.
UNEMPLOYMENT INS. SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
QUALITY APPRAISAL RESULTS FY 94, at 16 (1994).
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III. FACTORS PROMOTING EMPLOYER APPEALS
To evaluate properly the need for claimant representation
during unemployment compensation proceedings, it is necessary
to examine the forces underlying employer appeals. These
forces include the experience-rating system and third-party
employer representatives.
A. The Experience-RatingSystem

The experience-rating system imposes higher tax rates on
those employers who generate the most costs to the system.
This approach-unique to the United States-is very different
from the flat tax system that other industrialized nations
have adopted.5 ° Experience rating dates back to the creation
of the unemployment insurance program in 1935." 1 Original
proponents argued that experience rating would advance the
following goals: (1) encouraging stable employment, because
unnecessary layoffs would decrease as an employer's tax rate
increased; (2) distributing costs to those employers most
responsible for unemployment; and (3) encouraging employers
to participate actively in policing the system by stimulating
them to contest unwarranted claims for benefits.52
Our primary focus is on this third goal of experience rating
and the extent to which the experience-rating system promotes unnecessary appeals by employers. A prominent critic
of the experience-rating system has stated that the system
"has primarily resulted in increasingly significant and sophisticated employer involvement in the litigation of unemployment compensation claims."5 ' The business community argues

50.
STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FIN. AND STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND
MEANS, 102d CONG., 2d SESS., UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION IN THE GROUP OF
SEVEN NATIONS: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON 8-9 (Jt. Comm. Print 1992);
BLAUSTEIN ET AL., supra note 34, at 102-04.

51.

BLAUSTEIN ET AL., supra note 34, at 147.

52.
1995 ACUC REPORT, supra note 28, at 73. With respect to the first two goals,
research shows that the experience-rating system may have had some measurable
impact, although these findings continue to be debated. Id. at 85-86.
53.
Morris, supra note 21, at 665. Morris, a member of the 1980 National
Commission on Unemployment Compensation, claims that
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that, while there may be some cases in which claims are
challenged solely to avoid the tax, most employers only challenge non-meritorious cases.5 4 Other observers have questioned whether an employer derives any true financial
benefits from challenging claims based on the experiencerating system, because a substantial body of state law now
distributes the costs of favorable claims in certain categories
of cases across the system rather than charging an individual
employer.5 5
The common perception, however, is that the tax system
creates a substantial economic incentive for employers to challenge claims regardless of the case's objective merits. One
leading consultant, for example, has advised the business
community that "fighting-and winning-questionable claims
is in your best financial interest." 6 Empirical research,

economic advantages motivate employers to retain professional counsel, augment in-house staff, or hire outside specialists familiar with the routine of a
hearing procedure, the complexities of the law, and the State officials appointed
to decide claimant qualification. Employers deduct from their taxes the expenses for such services; thus, all taxpayers help finance employer litigation of
[unemployment insurance].

Id.
54.
Eric Millage, Corporate Counsel for Employers Unity, a nationwide firm that
represents employers in unemployment compensation cases, testified at a hearing in
front of the Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation:
I think that to have a blanket policy out there and say that there is no employer that has ever challenged it just because they want to save money, that
probably does happen. I'll tell you this much. I have personally supervised
about 60,000 claims come through ....
And any time that we go to a hearing,
the number one feedback that I get from my employer community is, you know,
Eric, we wouldn't mind letting this guy have unemployment insurance benefits
if he deserved it but he doesn't deserve it. And they're very convinced in their
heart of hearts that he or she shouldn't deserve it and that's why they're
fighting it.
Council Meeting and Public HearingBefore the Advisory Council on Unemployment
Compensation 139-40 (Nov. 30-Dec. 1, 1994) [hereinafter ACUC Testimony].
55.
For example, states often provide that the cost of payments to workers who
quit their last job are often shared among all unemployment insurance taxpayers.
See 1995 ACUC REPORT, supra note 28, at 78. In addition to such "noncharged
benefits," there is the phenomenon of "ineffectively charged benefits," which occurs
when an individual employer has reached the state's maximum tax rate and the rate
is still too low to cover former employees' benefits. Id. at 80. Additional claims fail
to trigger a higher tax rate. Id.
56.
J.D. Thorne, It's Not Your Fault, SMALL Bus. REP., Nov. 1992, at 46, 47; see
also Dawn Kopecki & Roger Thompson, Jobless Benefits Cost Firms More, NATION'S
BUS., Aug. 1994, at 56, 56-57 (warning that "[f] ailure to contest claims made by employees who have quit or were fired can send an employer's unemployment insurance
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though still preliminary, tends to support this perception. For
example, in Puerto Rico, which had a flat tax until 1992, 57
employer appeals were seven times lower than the national
average.5 8 Similarly, in the State of Washington, which has
had a history of using both the flat tax and the experiencerating system, employer appeals were significantly lower
during the tenure of the flat tax system. 59 A 1985 study
conducted by the Department of Labor's Office of Inspector
General compared employers who had reached the maximum
tax rate in their state with employers operating under the
variable tax rates while still subject to the impact of experience rating. The study found that the employers who had
reached the maximum rate were less likely to file a benefit
appeal."0 Thus, although the Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation (ACUC) has stated that "[it is
difficult to determine the extent to which employers appeal
even those [unemployment insurance] claims that are legitimate," it recognizes that the experience-rating system provides an incentive to employers to contest claims and that
both lower- and higher-level "employer appeals have grown
more rapidly than claimant appeals." 6 '

B. Third-Party Employer Representatives

Another significant development in the unemployment compensation system-a development that has evaded public
scrutiny-is the expanding industry of third-party employer
representatives who specialize in workers' compensation and
unemployment compensation. These representatives-Gibbens
Company, Employers Unity, Gates McDonald & Company,
Frick Company, Harrington and Company, ADP Corporation,

costs soaring" and correlating successful unemployment claims with an increase in
civil claims based on "wrongful discharge, discrimination, or sexual harassment, or
all three"); Roger Thompson, Unemployment: Cutting the Costs, NATION'S Bus., Nov.
1989, at 71, 71 ("While not contesting a former employee's claim for unemployment
benefits may seem harmless enough at the time, the repercussions can be serious.').
57.
BLAUSTEIN ET AL., supra note 34, at 200. This presumably eliminated the
experience rating's economic incentive to challenge claims.
58.
1995 ACUC REPORT, supra note 28, at 87.
59.
Id.
60.
1996 ACUC REPORT, supra note 34, at 109 (citations omitted).
61.
Id.
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and others-provide a variety of "cost control" functions to
employers of all sizes, including direct representation at
unemployment compensation proceedings.6 2 It is a highly
competitive industry and it has been growing at a significant
pace as employers increasingly contract out their human
resources and payroll functions. 3
For example, Employers Unity, one of the largest of these
companies, serves over 2000 clients in every state and Puerto
Rico.6 4 In Colorado, where the company is based, more than
half of all businesses with fifty or more employees contract
with Employers Unity, translating into ten percent of all
unemployment claims in the state 6 5 In the early 1980s, Employers Unity's sales of services more than doubled every
year, until 1985, when growth slowed to a rate of thirty to
forty percent. 66 Most of the company's clients are large employers with more than twenty-five employees, and twenty to
thirty percent operate in more than one state.6 7 On average,
the company conducts 190 hearings per week.6 s
The potential impact on the unemployment compensation
appeals system resulting from this flood of third-party representatives cannot be underestimated. Indeed, this development could be a greater influence on the rate of employer

62.
Nationwide, there are 25 companies, 10 operate nationally and the rest work
regionally or locally. Telephone Interview with Warren Blue, Senior Vice President,
General Counsel, R.E. Harrington, Inc. and Board Member of the Association of
Unemployment Tax Organizations (AUTO) (Apr. 15, 1996). Depending on the company, their services include processing unemployment insurance claims; reviewing
unemployment taxes to determine that rates have been properly computed; challenging claims by employees; representing employers at hearings; and recommending
procedures and controls to reduce claims and cut unemployment costs. John Head,
State Workers' Comp Fund Goes Semiprivate,CRAIN'S CHI. Bus., Sept. 7, 1987, at 14,
14.
63.
See Jane Harding, Spooky Tale of Compliance, DENVER Bus., May 1986, at
12 (describing how Employers Unity helps businesses cut unemployment and
workers' compensation costs); Jon McKenna, Suggested Change in State Unemployment InsuranceHas Temp Business Worried, ATLANTA Bus. CHRON., Sept. 24, 1990,
at 1A, 15A (identifying the Frick Company as one that "tailors unemployment
insurance plans for companies"); Ellyn E. Spragins, The Hidden Cost of Firing,INC.,
May 1992, at 146, 146 (recommending hiring a company to monitor and audit unemployment claims); cf. Brian White, Payroll ProcessingFirms Enjoying Boom Times,
BUS. J. (Portland, Or.), July 13, 1987, Focus sec., at 9 (describing the emergence of
payroll processing firms, which take care of complex tasks of office management).
64.
ACUC Testimony, supra note 54, at 134; Harding, supra note 63, at 12.
65.
Harding, supra note 63, at 12.
66.
Id.
67.
ACUC Testimony, supra note 54, at 142.
68.
Id. at 139.
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appeals than the experience-rating system. Equally disturbing
is the fact that there has been no effort at the national level
to collect even the most basic information relating to the
growth and practices of this influential industry.

IV. SYSTEMIC LEGAL ISSUES

A discussion of representation in unemployment compensation proceedings must necessarily address four systemic legal
issues: claimants' due process rights; notification of the right
to representation at hearings; attorney's fees; and lay representation. This Part speaks to each issue in turn.

A. Due Process and the "FairHearing"Clause

Unemployment compensation hearings operate under basic
principles of due process pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution 9 and to the "fair
hearing" clause of the Social Security Act, which requires that
each state shall afford an "[o]pportunity for a fair hearing,
before an impartial tribunal, for all individuals whose claims
for unemployment compensation are denied."70 As the cornerstone of due process is notice and an opportunity for a fair
hearing, the Social Security Act thus requires that the
protections of due process be incorporated into the hearing
process of unemployed claimants.
Despite the recognition of unemployment benefits as a
property right subject to the requirements of due process and
the significant difference that representation makes to claimants in securing that right, no court has held that an unemployment claimant has the right to state-appointed counsel. A
California court squarely addressed this issue in Staley v.
California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board,7 in
which the claimant sought to set aside an adverse unemployment administrative decision on the ground that she was
denied due process because she had not been provided with

69.
70.
71.

US. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
42 U.S.C. § 503(a)(3) (1994).
86 Cal. Rptr. 294 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970).
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state-appointed counsel.7 2 The court refused to apply the
holding of Gideon v. Wainwright7 3 to the claimant's deprivation of unemployment benefits and found no constitutional
right to counsel in actions for the withdrawal of public assistance.74 The Staley case, however, was decided before an
important evolution in the United States Supreme Court's due
process theory, that is, the case of Mathews v. Eldridge.7 5
In Mathews v. Eldridge, the Supreme Court articulated the
standard to be applied to protect an individual's due process
rights when faced with the potential deprivation of a property
interest. The Mathews test requires balancing three factors:
(1) the property interest in the benefits involved, or "the
private interest;" (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation through
the procedures used, including the probable value of additional
or substitute procedures; and (3) the governmental and administrative interest, including fiscal burdens, or "the public interest."" As other commentators have argued, the three-part
balancing test set forth in Mathews is an appropriate standard
for determining whether an individual is constitutionally
entitled to representation of counsel in an administrative
proceeding.7 7 The application of Mathews to the issue of stateappointed representation in unemployment proceedings requires a re-examination of the holding in Staley for several
reasons.
First, the Court has suggested that unemployment compensation claimants are entitled to due process, stating that
"[r] elevant constitutional restraints apply as much to the withdrawal of public assistance benefits as to disqualification for
unemployment compensation."7" Accordingly, numerous courts
have imposed constitutional standards on unemployment

72.
Id. at 295.
73.
372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (establishing that indigent criminal defendants
have the right to state-appointed counsel).
74.
Staley, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 295.
75.
424 U.S. 319 (1976).
76.
Id. at 335.
77.
E.g., Scherer, supra note 17, at 563-79 (arguing that when the Mathews test
is applied to eviction proceedings, the constitutional right to due process of law
encompasses the right to representation of counsel for poor people facing the loss of
their homes).
78.
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970). The Supreme Court has also
prohibited laws or procedures which inhibit a claimant's ability to receive unemployment insurance benefits. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404-05
(1963) (finding that a claimant who, for religious reasons, refused to work on
Saturdays was unconstitutionally denied unemployment benefits, because such a
denial of benefits violated her First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion).
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agencies.7 9 As one federal district court found: "[Tihe payment
of unemployment benefits ... permits retention of the basic
human dignity that past accomplishment alone merits, avoiding, in Macaulay's stark phrase, sinking, after many vicissitudes of fortune, into 'abject and hopeless poverty.' ' s°
Certainly claimants' interests in unemployment benefits can
no longer be distinguished from the "brutal need""' of welfare
beneficiaries for their own benefits. The claimant's interest in
receiving unemployment benefits during periods of involuntary
unemployment is considerable, as the funds are essential to
help pay necessary expenditures such as food, shelter, and
medical care. 2
The second prong of the Mathews test, the risk of erroneous
deprivation, requires one to look at the data which show that
claimants enjoy significantly improved outcomes when they are
represented. 3 This data demonstrates substantial risk of error
in cases where claimants are not represented. 4 This prong also
necessitates an analysis of the administrative procedures used
in unemployment benefits cases, as these procedures have
become increasingly complex and therefore intimidating to
uninitiated claimants. If one side is unrepresented, as in the
case of many unemployment benefits hearings, the "pure"
adversarial nature of the proceeding is tainted by an imbalance
of knowledge in the particulars of unemployment compensation
law and procedure. Thus, one cannot overstate the risk of
deprivation looming before the claimant appealing a case

79.
See, e.g., Cosby v. Ward, 843 F.2d 967, 982 (7th Cir. 1988); Moore v. Ross,
502 F. Supp. 543, 551 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), affd, 687 F.2d 604 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1115 (1983); Drumwright v. Padzieski, 436 F. Supp. 310, 319 (E.D. Mich.
1977); Pregent v. New Hampshire Dep't of Employment Sec., 361 F. Supp. 782, 788
(D.N.H. 1973); Wheeler v. Vermont, 335 F. Supp. 856, 861 (D. Vt. 1971); AFL-CIO v.
California Employment Dev. Dep't, 152 Cal. Rptr. 193, 198 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979).
80.
Wheeler, 335 F. Supp. at 861-62.
81.
See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 261 (quoting Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893,
899, 900 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)).
82.
One Supreme Court Justice opined that California, which sought to delay
payment of unemployment benefits pending an employer appeal, was disingenuous
in its attempt to distinguish Goldberg on the ground that unemployment compensation unlike welfare is not based on need, because "history makes clear that the thrust
of the scheme for unemployment benefits was to take care of the need of displaced
workers, pending a search for other employment." California Dep't of Human
Resources Dev. v. Java, 402 U.S. 121, 135 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring).
83.
See supra text accompanying notes 10, 13.
84.
Specifically, the 31% reversal rate for claimant appeals at the first-level
hearing stage attests to the need for a substantial check on the system's denial of
unemployment benefits. See supra text accompanying note 5.
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without representation-especially for low-wage earners who,
as a group, disproportionately exhaust their unemployment
benefits.8 5
Finally, an analysis of the Mathews test's third prong, the socalled "public interest" prong, demonstrates that the public
interest is served when a claimant receives benefits. In Cali6
forniaDepartmentof Human Resources Development v. Java,"
the United States Supreme Court found that unemployment
compensation, by preventing a decline in the income of the
unemployed, serves to aid industries which produce goods and
services, by maintaining the purchasing power of unemployed
consumers." Increased claimant representation, which leads
to more successful claimant challenges, could also result in
significant governmental savings, given that large numbers of
claimants who are denied benefits often end up in poverty relying on public assistance, 8 which typically does not provide the
same work-search assistance or training opportunities available to those on unemployment assistance.
The third prong of the Mathews balancing test also considers
the extent to which the public interest is served by providing
an efficient administration ofjustice.8 9 In essence, the question
is whether the costs of improving access to representation
outweigh the benefits to the claimant and to the unemployment
compensation system.
The UIS has long argued that the costs of improving access
to claimant representation are prohibitive, claiming that

85.
See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, FAMILY INCOMES OF UNEMPLOYMENT
INSURANCE RECIPIENTS AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR EXTENDING BENEFITS 33-41 (1990);
WALTER CORSON & MARK DYNARSKI, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, A STUDY OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE RECIPIENTS AND EXHAUSTEES: FINDINGS FROM A NATIONAL SURVEY
13-16 (1990).

86.
87.

402 U.S. 121 (1971).
Id. at 131.

88.

See DIVISION OF RESEARCH AND STATISTICS, supranote 30, at 4 (reporting that

26% of Emergency Unemployment Compensation exhaustees were receiving public
assistance one year after exhausting their benefits). Indeed, many states have funded
projects called Disability Advocacy Projects (DAP) to provide representation in
federally funded Supplemental Security Income (SSI) cases specifically to avoid reliance on state funded public assistance programs including General Assistance. See
Jane Hardin, DisabilityAdvocacy Projects:ProgramsThat Assist Low-Income Clients
and Ease State Government Fiscal Problems, 26 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 776, 782-84
(1992).

89.

See Scherer, supranote 17, at 576 ("In evaluating the governmental interest

in the appointment of counsel for indigent defendants in eviction proceedings... [one
must consider] the government's interest in the administration ofjustice, the just and
equitable distribution of finite financial resources, and its interest in the health,
safety and welfare of its citizens.").
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representation leads to increased administrative burdens such
as longer proceedings and more delays.9" The only available
evidence of this claim is found in an analysis of one state's
program, the Illinois Legal Services Program, which funded
attorney representation for claimants and small employers.9 1
An evaluation of the Illinois program showed that hearing time
increased when one or both of the parties were represented and
that a greater percentage of such cases were granted continuances.9 2 To the extent, however, that a large percentage of
employers are probably already represented at hearings, the
Illinois program evaluation did not measure the net increase
in costs, if any, resulting from the addition of a claimant
representative in the proceedings.
Conspicuously absent from the UIS position against representation is an evaluation of the benefits of claimant
representation, which are many. Most importantly, representation ensures fairer hearings, an issue that takes on
special significance given that employers are disproportionately
represented on appeal. In addition, the unemployment compensation system cuts costs whenever claimants decide not to
appeal a case based on an advocate's advice that the case is
without merit. Finally, hearing officers are less burdened when
not required to usher the proceedings for pro se claimants.
In short, it is necessary to scrutinize closely both the costs
and benefits of improving claimants' access to representation
before determining that the public interest is not so served. As
stated above, the potential benefits of increased representation,
such as direct savings to the unemployment compensation system and government-funded public assistance programs, are

90.
See, e.g., Letter from Mary Ann Wyrsch, Director, Unemployment Insurance
Service, to Richard W. McHugh, Associate General Counsel, International Union,
United Auto Workers 2 (Oct. 25, 1989) (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform) ("[T]he introduction of additional individuals into the

appellate process would inevitably result in the process being delayed."); cf U.S. Dep't
of Labor, Response to Briefing Book: U.S. Department of Labor Oversight and Reform
of the Unemployment Compensation Program (Employment Task Force, National

Employment Law Project, Inc., ed., 1994) (Sept. 20, 1994) (on file with the University
of Michigan Journalof Law Reform) ("[The Department of Labor] has always taken

the position that the [unemployment insurance] appellate process should be nontechnical and informal so that representation of the parties would not be necessary.").
91.
MONITORING EVALUATION DIV., ILLINOIS DEP'TOF EMPLOYMENT SEC., LEGAL
SERVICES PROGRAM REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 1992, at 3-4 (1992) [hereinafter ILLINOIS
LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM REPORT]. This program is governed by ILL. ADMIN. CODE
tit. 56, § 2712.201-.210 (Supp. 1993).
92.
ILLINOIS LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM REPORT, supra note 91, at 3.
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often overlooked. As Justice Learned Hand stated, "'If we are
to keep our democracy there must be one commandment: thou
shall not ration justice.' " A balancing of the costs and benefits should therefore err on the side of claimant access to
representation in the unemployment compensation system,
ensuring access for low-wage workers and others unable to
afford representation or to represent themselves adequately.
B. Notice of the Right to Representation at Hearings
and the Availability of Low-Cost Representation
Whether or not due process requires unemployment agencies
to provide state-appointed representation, recent state court
decisions suggest that the due process clause extends to
notification of the right to representation.94 Where so held, a
procedure reasonably calculated to provide this information to

93.
Jack B. Weinstein, The Poor's Right to EqualAccess to the Courts, 13 CONN.
L. REV. 651, 657 (1981) (citation omitted).
94.
Some states grant a claimant a new hearing if he is not provided with notice
of her right to counsel. See, e.g., Sandlin v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec.
Div., 406 N.E.2d 328, 332 (Ind.Ct. App. 1980) (holding that the claimant had a due
process right to a procedure reasonably calculated to inform him of his right to
counsel); Katz v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 430 A.2d 354, 354-55
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981) (holding that fairness and state regulation required that
claimants be notified of the right to counsel, even though this holding contradicted
another Pennsylvania court's interpretation of a fair hearing). Other states only grant
a new hearing if the claimant is prejudiced by a hearing officer's failure to not inform
her of her right to counsel. See, e.g., Berzins v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment
Sec. Div., 439 N.E.2d 1121, 1123, 1127 (Ind. 1992) (stating that although due process
requires procedures "reasonably calculated to provide notice to employers and
claimants of the right to be represented at evidentiary hearings," the failure to so
notify does not ipso facto require reversal where the claimant has had the benefit of
a full and fair hearing); Sotak v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 422
N.E.2d 445, 447-48 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that although failure to provide
written notice of right to representation is not reversible error per se, reversal and
remand were required here, where the referee failed to discharge the affirmative duty
to examine claimant's witnesses and cross-examine opposing witnesses to ensure the
protection of the claimant's interests).
Still other states have declined to find a constitutional right to be notified of the
right to counsel and have based the right to notification on a state statute. See, e.g.,
Simmons v. Traughber, 791 S.W.2d 21, 24 (Tenn. 1990) (holding that failure to advise
the claimant adequately of the possible availability of free or low-cost legal representation violated her statutory right to a fair hearing, entitling the claimant to a new
hearing).
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claimants must include written notification before the hearing
of the right to appear with a representative.95
In Simmons v. Traughber,6 the Tennessee Supreme Court

addressed the fact that for indigent claimants the right to
representation is meaningless because it is unaffordable. The
Simmons court held that a notice to the parties of an unemployment compensation hearing that stated, "You may be
represented by counsel or other authorized representative at
your own expense" did not adequately inform the plaintiff of
her statutory right to be represented at the hearing. The
court reasoned that "[tihe tone of the notice was negative and
misleading. For many unemployed claimants, a notice that they
can be represented by counsel at their own expense will
terminate their interest in obtaining an attorney and seeking
benefits under the statute." 8 The court found that the claimant
was prejudiced by lack of counsel and recognized that "the adversarial nature of the hearing makes counsel especially
important in employment security cases."99
As a result of the Simmons ruling, hearing notices for
unemployment compensation hearings in Tennessee now offer
the following information:
You may be represented by an attorney or any other authorized representative of your choosing. If you cannot
afford an attorney, free or low cost assistance may be available through your local legal services organization or bar
association. 100

95.
See, e.g., Morgan v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 34,37-38
(Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (finding no violation of due process because the claimant was
provided with a document informing him of his right to have a representative present
and of the availability of free legal representation in the community).
96.
791 S.W.2d 21 (Tenn. 1990).
97.
Id. at 24. But see Staley v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 86 Cal.
Rptr. 294, 296 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970) (finding that the California unemployment agency
had no responsibility to advise a claimant that free counsel was available to represent
her in an administrative hearing).
98.
Simmons, 791 S.W.2d at 24.
99.
Id. at 25.
100. Hearings Notice of the Department of Employment Security Appeals Tribunal,
Nashville, Tennessee 1 (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform). Advocates at Legal Services of South Central Tennessee, Inc., remain
concerned that this information, buried in other text, still fails to constitute meaningful notice of the availability of free services. Memorandum from David Kozlowski,
Staff Attorney, Legal Services of South Central Tennessee, to Monica Halas, Senior
Attorney, Greater Boston Legal Services (Mar. 14, 1995) (on file with the University
of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
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Ohio recently tested the Simmons notice. The State of Ohio
Unemployment Compensation Board of Review convened a
committee comprised of representatives from the Board, service
companies, private bar, legal aid, and labor unions to study the
representation needs of claimants and employers in unemployment compensation hearings before the Board. 01' To determine
whether claimants and small employers-which they defined
as employers with fewer than 500 employees-were in need of
representation, the committee conducted a survey of individuals who appeared unrepresented. The survey was conducted
over the course of a year in two separate locations; results were
tabulated after one hundred questionnaires were compiled.' 2
The tabulated results showed that fifty-two percent of all
parties stated that they appeared at the hearing unrepresented
because they believed that representation was not necessary.
Forty-nine percent of those surveyed post-hearing, however,
felt that they had needed representation, and eighty-nine percent of those represented stated that representation helped. 10 3
C. Attorney's Fees in Unemployment
Compensation Cases
Many commentators have argued that access to representation could be increased significantly by enlarging attorney's
fees in unemployment compensation cases. 0 4 Most state unemployment statutes currently provide for some limited form of
"fee generating" mechanism at the administrative and judicial

101. OHIO UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION BD. OF REVIEW, OHIO UNEMPLOYMENT
COMPENSATION APPEALS REPRESENTATION REPORT 1 (1995).

102. Id. at 1-2.
103. Id. at app. C. The conclusions are somewhat limited because the surveys did
not record whether or not the represented/unrepresented party had won, which party
started the appeal, or which had the burden of proof. The survey did, however, record
the huge disparity in representation for claimants and employers. In 6% of the
hearings claimants only were represented, whereas in 43% of the hearings employers
only were represented; both parties were represented in 9% of the hearings. Id. at 8.
Thus, employers were represented in 50% of the hearings, whereas claimants secured
representation in only 15% of the hearings. See id.
104. See Alan Goldhammer, Legal Fees in Nonbusiness Administrative Claims, 26
HASTINGS L.J. 1127, 1139 (1975); Paul Wyler, Administrative Law Judge, California
Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board, Statement in Support of California Assembly Bill No. 1195, at 4 (1987) (on file with the University of Michigan Journalof

Law Reform).
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review levels.1 °5 Here, we will briefly analyze the current law
regarding attorney's fees and the proposals for reform, with a
view toward their impact on the unemployment compensation
appeals system generally and claimant representation in particular.
State laws uniformly allow both claimant and employer
representatives to charge attorney's fees in cases on administrative appeal. 0 6 The states vary in the amount allowed, with
most leaving the determination of an appropriate fee to the
appeals tribunal.' 7 Some place strict caps in terms of a dollar
amount per case, 0 S a percentage of the maximum benefits at
issue, 10 9 or both. 1 0 A minority of states also provides for attorney's fees and costs upon judicial review of an administrative
appeal. The state's administrative security fund usually
absorbs the fees and costs of cases in which the claimant is
successful in his appeal to the court."' Finally, several states

105.

See NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT LAW PROJECT, INC., SURVEY OF STATE LAW PRO-

VISIONS RELATING TO REPRESENTATION IN UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION PROCEED-

INGS (1995).
106. See id.
107. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 23.20.470 (1990); CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1957
(West 1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-272(b)(2) (West Supp. 1995); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 46-119(c) (1990 & Supp. 1995); FLA. STAT. ch. 443.041(2) (1995); IDAHO CODE
§ 72-1375(b) (1989); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 820, para. 405/1200 (Smith-Hurd 1993); IOWA
CODE § 96.15(2) (1981); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-718(b) (1993); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 341.470(2) (Michie 1990 & Supp. 1994); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1692 (West 1985);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1044(2) (West 1988); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMP. § 8507(b) (1991); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151A, § 37 (West 1994); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 421.31 (West 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 268.105(6) (West 1996); MISS. CODE.
ANN. § 71-5-537 (1972); MO. REV. STAT. § 288.380(5) (1994); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-513104(2) (1995); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-646 (1993); NEV. REV. STAT. § 612.705(2) (1991);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 282-A: 158 (1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 51-1-37(B) (Michie 1978);
OR. REV. STAT. § 657.295(2) (1995); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 862 (1991); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 41-39-30 (Law. Co-op. 1986); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 61-7-22 (1993); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 50-7-708(b)(2) (1991); VA. CODE ANN. § 60.2-123 (Michie 1992); WASH.
REV. CODE § 50.32.110 (1994); W. VA. CODE § 21A-10-5 (1989); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit.
29, § 706(n) (1995).
108. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-674(B)(3) (1995) ($750 fee); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 11-10-108(b) (Michie 1987) ($250 fee); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 538(c)(d) (McKinney
1988) ($500 fee).
109. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 25-4-139 (1975) (10%); HAW. REV. STAT. § 383-162
(1993) (10%); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:21-51 (West 1991) (20%); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-4457(a), (b) (1995) (10% for a proceeding or court action and 15% for an appeal when an
employer appeals a decision favorable to the claimant); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1356
(1988) (10%); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 108.09(8) (West 1988) (10%); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 24,
§ 306(j) (1993) (10%).
110. See, e.g., Del. Reg. 20(4)(a).
111. ALASKA STAT. § 23.20.470(b) (1990); FLA. STAT. ch. 443.041(2)(b), (c) (1995);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1044(2) (West 1988); N.D. CENT. CODE § 52-06-32
(1989); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-44-57(c) (1995); WASH. REV. CODE § 50.32.160 (1994); P.R.
LAWS ANN. tit. 29, § 706(n) (1995); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 306(j) (1993).
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allow for assessment of court costs against claimants or employers in cases in which the court determines that the proceedings for judicial review have been instituted without
"reasonable grounds" or in "bad faith." 12
In contrast to the current approach toward recovery of
attorney's fees, state legislators have introduced proposals to
create the state equivalent of the Federal Equal Access to
Justice Act (EAJA), where the government awards reasonable
fees to the "prevailing party" in agency proceedings that are
adversarial in nature. For example, in California, a bill allowed
for representation fees to be paid to the prevailing party from
the unemployment compensation contingent fund based on the
"financial ability of the party applying for fees to pay for
representation."" 3 The legislation died in committee, however,
and has not yet been re-introduced. Interestingly, Nebraska
once allowed for recovery of fees in administrative proceedings,
funding4 recovery through the unemployment compensation
11
fund.

Given the limitations on attorney's fees, the private bar
generally has not played an active role in representing claimants in unemployment compensation proceedings. 115 Requiring
claimants to pay fees out of benefit awards would negate the
whole purpose of unemployment insurance as income replacement. Yet, some private attorneys have argued that states

112. ALASKA STAT. § 23.20.460 (1990) (court costs against the claimant); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 11-10-106(b) (Michie 1987) (court costs against the claimant or the employer);
CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1958 (West 1986) ("penalty" assessed against claimant or
employer); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-272(b)(1) (West Supp. 1995) (court costs
against the appellant); IDAHO CODE § 72-1375(b) (1989) (attorney's fees and/or court
costs against the claimant); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1692 (West 1985) (court costs
against the claimant); OKLA. STAT. tit. 40, § 2-302(1) (1991) (court costs against the
claimant); P.R. LAwS ANN. tit. 29, § 706(l) (1995) (court costs against the claimant);
V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 306(h) (1993) (court costs against the claimant).
113. Cal. H.B. No. 1195, 1987-1988 Reg. Sess. (1987) (on file with the University
of Michigan Journalof Law Reform).
114. E.g., Act of Protection of Rights and Benefits, ch. 108, § 15, 1937 Neb. Laws
399 (codified at NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-646 (repealed 1986)). The law provided that
"[alny individual claiming benefits in any proceeding before the commissioner or an
appeal tribunal or his or its representative or a court may be represented by counsel
or other duly authorized agent, and such counsel may either charge or receive for such
services a reasonable fee to be approved by the commissioner. The commissioner may,
in special cases, pay such fee from the Unemployment Compensation Administrative
Fund." Id.
115. See Goldhammer, supra note 104, at 1140 ("[Klnowing that the client is in
need of insurance proceeds, the attorney is justifiably skeptical of promises of payment
on a contingent basis, because he has no remedy if the client refuses to pay. The result
is a rejection of all such cases.").
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should impose and enforce liens on benefits in cases in which
the claimant does not make payment in accordance with a fee
agreement, as done in social security disability appeals. 116 In
the end, absent a substantial shift in the nature of the policy
debate, the states probably will resist efforts to encourage fee
generating and private bar involvement in the unemployment
compensation system. Depending on the experience of those
states that have already adopted the concept of sanctions in
frivolous appeals, however, there may be opportunities to
augment sanctioning and perhaps thereby discourage employer
appeals in nonmeritorious cases.

D. Lay Representation

Lay advocacy for unemployment compensation claimants
involves the participation of diverse individuals: paralegals and
law students under the supervision of attorneys, union representatives, and community representatives. Although a few bar
associations have challenged lay advocacy, 1 7 lay advocates can
represent parties at unemployment compensation hearings in
most states, either by statute or under judicial decisions
finding that such representation does not constitute the unauthorized practice of law.' 18

116. See Goldhammer, supra note 104, at 1140.
117. See Rick McHugh, Lay Representationin Unemployment InsuranceHearings:
Some Strategiesfor Change, 16 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 865, 866-67 (1983).
118. See, e.g., Hunt v. Maricopa County Employees Merit System Comm'n, 619
P.2d 1036, 1041 (Ariz. 1980) (allowing lay representation of employees in administrative hearings but noting that there is no statutory privilege protecting the
confidentiality of communications between an employee and her lay representative);
Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. of the Superior Court v. Employers Unity, Inc.,
716 P.2d 460, 464 (Colo. 1986) (holding constitutional a statute that authorized unlicensed practice of law before an unemployment agency); State Bar v. Galloway, 369
N.W.2d 839, 843 (Mich. 1985) (holding that a statute allowing employer representation
by counsel or other duly authorized agent in proceedings before the unemployment
agency permitted representation by nonattorneys, notwithstanding unauthorized
practice-of-law statutes); Henize v. Giles, 490 N.E.2d 585, 588 (Ohio 1986) (holding
that interested parties or their nonlawyer representatives who appear at administrative unemployment compensation hearings are not engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law). But see Kyle v. Beco Corp., 707 P.2d 378, 382-83 (Idaho 1985)
(holding that, if a corporation is represented in the Industrial Commission's proceedings, the representative must be an attorney); Reed v. Labor & Indus. Relations
Comm'n, 789 S.W.2d 19, 22 (Mo. 1990) (holding that, if a nonattorney employee files
an application for review on behalf of a corporate employer, it constitutes the
unauthorized practice of law).
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Lay advocacy raises two critical issues: whether this type of
advocacy is necessary to ensure adequate representation and
whether lay advocacy is effective-i.e., what are claimants'
success rates at hearings with lay advocates? Administrative
agencies are largely receptive to lay advocates. " 9 Yet, whether
lay advocacy should be permitted and expanded has been
the
120
subject of considerable debate among the private bar.
The issue of nonlawyer effectiveness is just beginning to
attract the attention of scholars. As one commentator noted,
the difficulty of isolating representation as the critical variable
in the outcome of a particular case presents an obstacle to
assessing advocacy effectiveness.12 ' Nonetheless, the collected
data support the conclusion that an advocate familiar not only
with the particular substantive area but also with the procedures of a particular agency may provide an even better chance
of winning than an attorney who does not customarily handle
these claims.' 2 2
Herbert Kritzer, Professor of Political Science and Law at
the University of Wisconsin, has completed recently an extensive study of the effect of nonlawyer representation. Professor
Kritzer researched the effectiveness of nonlawyers in four
administrative settings in Wisconsin, including unemployment

119. Deborah L. Rhode, The Delivery of Legal Services by Non-Lawyers, 4 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 209, 215 (1990). Rhode notes that the California State Bar Commission
on Legal Technicians has listed the area of government benefits among specialties
"worthy of study" for proposed licensing. Id. at 227. She further comments that
governmental benefits is an area in which additional assistance is sorely needed in
low-income populations. Id. at 229 (citing THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, NATIONAL
SURVEY OF THE CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF THE POOR 32-33 (1989)).
120. See, e.g., Colloquium on Nonlawyer Practice Before Federal Administrative
Agencies, 37 ADMIN. L. REV. 357 (1985). Advocates of nonlawyer representation argue
that lay advocacy should be expanded because of: (1) the specialized competence of
certain nonlawyers; (2) the administrative setting, which presents issues that are less
legally complex and which rely on less formal procedural rules; (3) the unavailability
of lawyers, particularly where the monetary interest at stake may be small; and (4)
greater freedom of choice. Id. at 363-73, 391-96. Opponents of expanding the role of
nonlawyers argue that: (1) nonlawyers cannot competently discharge all the responsibilities of a lawyer which, even in an administrative setting, may include due process
concerns and challenging regulations; (2) many aspects of the hearings .are quasijudicial and/or adversarial in nature; (3) there also may be an unavailability of
competent nonlawyers; and (4) competent nonlawyers may charge high fees as well.
Id. at 375-81, 385-89; see also Loyd P. Derby, Comment, The UnauthorizedPractice
ofLaw by Laymen and Lay Associations, 54 CAL. L. REV. 1331, 1333 (1966) (mentioning the bar's organized campaigns to halt lay representation).
121. Popkin, supra note 15, at 451.
122. See Popkin, supra note 17, at 1043.
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compensation appeals hearings. 1 3 He concluded that, in the
unemployment context, a combination of factors result in effective advocacy, the two most important of which are advocacy
experience and substantive knowledge. 124 Professor Kritzer
found that, overall, the greatest impact on success rates in
most unemployment compensation proceedings was representation itself, with no clear difference between lawyer and nonlawyer representation. 125 Lawyer representation constituted a
clear advantage when both parties had a lawyer; then, the
claimant had a fifty-four percent success rate, compared to
merely nineteen percent when only the employer had a

lawyer. 126
This study is important: By determining in which cases
lawyer and nonlawyer representation has a greater impact,
scarce resources can be targeted more effectively. The study
contributes to a growing body of evidence supporting the critical importance of representation in any adversarial administrative proceeding such as the unemployment compensation
hearing.

V. MODELS OF REPRESENTATION

This Part reports on the results of a survey that the National
Employment Law Project developed to identify the range of
programs currently offering services to unemployed workers.
We found an impressive mix, ranging from community-based
organizations which provide intensive peer counseling to
federally funded legal services programs, labor union programs,
special state-funded projects, private bar pro bono projects, law
school clinical programs, and student-run volunteer organizations, each of which provides direct representation in
unemployment compensation proceedings. This Part profiles
this diverse pool of projects and evaluates their unique contributions to the goal of improving access to the unemployment
benefits system.

123.
124.
125.
126.

Kritzer, supra note 14.
Id. at 130.
Id. at 131.

Id.
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A. Community-Based Organizations

Organizations with bases in the community constitute
invaluable resources for claimants suffering from the shock of
job loss. These organizations provide a familiar place of solace
where laid-off workers can discuss their problems, get information about rights and benefits, and learn that there are
others experiencing the same problems. Around the country,
many such organizations play an active role in ensuring that
workers pursue their unemployment compensation claims.' 2 7
In Pennsylvania, the Mon Valley Unemployed Committee
was formed in 1982 in response to the shutdown of the steel
mills. 12 The staff advises unemployed workers on their rights
to unemployment benefits and provides pre-hearing guidance. 1 29 The Philadelphia Unemployment Project provides
counsel, including representation in first-level hearings to
approximately thirty individuals each year.3 0 These organizations also influence national policy decisions regarding the
unemployment compensation system, job training, and other
issues of significant importance to the unemployed.
Community organizations based in immigrant communities
also play a critical role. These organizations often function as
a liaison to state agencies by providing basic information
regarding unemployment benefits, translating forms, and
offering interpreter services. The Workers Center of the Chinese Progressive Association exemplifies these services. It
emerged in Boston in 1977 from community-based campaigns
to save jobs and to secure English-as-a-second-language and
job training.' 3 ' The Center has produced bilingual pamphlets

127. See, e.g., Using Legal Training to Serve the Community, EAST SAN JosIt
COMMUNITY L. CENTER NEWSLETTER (East San Josd Community Law Ctr., San Jos6,
Cal.), Winter 1994-1995, at 1, 6.
128. Response of Mon Valley Unemployed Comm., Homestead, Pa., to NELP
Survey of Representation at Unemployment Compensation Proceedings 1 (on file with
the University of Michigan Journalof Law Reform).
129. Id. at 3.

130. Response of Philadelphia Unemployment Project, Philadelphia, Pa., to NELP
Survey of Representation at Unemployment Compensation Proceedings 3, 4 (on file
with the University of Michigan Journalof Law Reform).
131. Response of Chinese Progressive Ass'n, Boston, Mass., to NELP Survey of
Representation at Unemployment Compensation Proceedings 1, 3 (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
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explaining how to obtain unemployment benefits. 13 2 The advice
provided, which includes basic information like directions to
the local unemployment office, what to bring to apply for
benefits, and how to obtain interpreter services,' 33 often makes
the difference as to whether or not an individual receives his
benefits.

B. Publicly Funded Legal Services Programs

The federally funded Legal Services Corporation (LSC),
which provides free legal services in civil proceedings for poor
and low-income individuals,'3 4 provides another resource for
claimants seeking representation in unemployment compensation cases. In many communities, the LSC offices offer the only
program through which claimants may obtain representation
in unemployment compensation cases. Unfortunately, resources
and staffing have declined significantly, with further reduc35
tions in funding expected in the coming months.'
As reported in our survey, the local LSC offices that represent claimants in unemployment compensation proceedings
appear at 10 to 200 hearings per year, mostly in first-level
appeals but also in second-level and judicial-level appeals.'3 6
Those offices that conduct unemployment compensation hearings generally report high levels of success on appeal. 37 In

132. See, e.g., CHINESE PROGRESSIVE ASS'N WORKERS CTR., A HANDBOOK ON UNEMPLOYED RIGHTS (1990).
133. Response of Chinese Progressive Ass'n, supra note 131, at 3.
134. 42 U.S.C. § 2996b (1994).
135. See Center for Law & Social Policy, Comparison of Current LSC Act and
Regulations with Pending Legal Services Appropriations and Authorization Bills (Jan.
17, 1996) (on file with the University of Michigan Journalof Law Reform) (breaking
down the features of four different bills seeking to reorganize or dismantle the LSC).
136. See, e.g., Response of Georgia Legal Servs. Program, Atlanta, Ga., to NELP
Survey of Representation at Unemployment Compensation Proceedings 4 (on file with
the Universityof Michigan Journalof Law Reform) (appearing in approximately 110
hearings at all levels, but mostly in first-level hearings); Response of New Orleans
Legal Assistance Corp., New Orleans, La., to NELP Survey of Representation at
Unemployment Compensation Proceedings 4 (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform) (appearing in 155 to 200 proceedings per year at all levels,
though primarily in first-level appeals).
137. See, e.g., Response of San Francisco Legal Assistance Found., San Francisco,
Cal., to NELP Survey of Representation at Unemployment Compensation Proceedings
4 (on file with the University of MichiganJournalof Law Reform) (reporting that the
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addition, several programs with experienced employment law
advocates often litigate class action cases in federal and state
courts, thus affecting a large number of claimants. 3 ' As
described below, legal services programs also have been actively involved in developing programs through which the private
139
bar may participate in unemployment compensation cases.
Unfortunately, as consistently reported in our survey, the
demand for legal services representation far exceeds the availability of services.140

C. Private Bar Pro Bono Projects

Joint ventures between Legal Services Corporation programs
and bar associations have created Volunteer Lawyers Projects
(VLPs), organizations which use private attorneys in the pro
bono representation of legal services eligible clients in civil
matters.'
VLPs handle a wide variety of legal claims and

Foundation wins almost all its cases); Response of Legal Servs. Org. of Ind., Evansville, Ind., to NELP Survey of Representation at Unemployment Compensation
Proceedings 4 (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform)
(reporting a success rate of 50-85% on the different levels of appeal).
138. See, e.g., White v. Evans, 597 A.2d 419 (Md. 1991) (reversing summary
judgment in favor of state where legal and organizations represented claimants in
class action challenging state policies regarding reduction, delay, termination of
unemployment insurance benefits); Ross v. Giles, 1C Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH)
21,899 (S.D. Ohio 1988) (finding "when due" provision violated where legal aid
organizations filed suit on behalf of class who had waited two to three years for
decisions in second-level appeals).
139. See, e.g., Response of Legal Servs. of N. Va., Fairfax, Va., to NELP Survey
of Representation at Unemployment Compensation Proceedings 3 (on file with the
University ofMichigan Journalof Law Reform) (describing the organization's pro bono
program for volunteer attorneys and paralegals).
140. See, e.g., Response of Legal Servs. of Greater Miami, Fla., to NELP Survey
of Representation at Unemployment Compensation Proceedings 5 (on file with the
University of Michigan Journalof Law Reform) (stating organization's limitation is
"not having enough staff to represent all claimants that need" services).
141. See, e.g., Response of Maine Volunteer Lawyers Project, Portland, Me., to
NELP Survey of Representation at Unemployment Compensation Proceedings 1 (on
file with University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (describing the Project's
purpose to utilize private attorneys to assist the low-income population with civil legal
problems). In addition to pro bono representation, bar associations may refer indigent
clients to reduced fees panels. For example, the Philadelphia Bar Association has a
Low Fee Plan Committee which, at the request of Community Legal Services in
Philadelphia, has recently added a panel for handling administrative hearings in
unemployment compensation cases. The fee for attending the hearing is $200. Letter
from Paul J. Kazaras, Director of Legal and Public Services, Philadelphia Bar
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often specialize in a particular area of law. 142 The budget for
these projects is usually a14 3 combination of LSC funding and
private bar contributions.
Generally speaking, unless particular state unemployment
agencies are cooperative in the timing of administrative
appeals, the quick scheduling of hearings does not provide
144
sufficient time for the VLP coordinator to find an attorney.
A few VLP programs, however, devote targeted resources to
unemployment compensation hearings. For example, the Maine
VLP conducted 215 unemployment administrative appeals in
1994 with a success rate of sixty-one percent, compared with
an overall success rate of forty percent for all unemployment
claimants in Maine. 145 The Massachusetts VLP is embarking
on an unemployment advocacy project with the Labor and
Employment Law Section of the Massachusetts Bar Association; private attorneys with training provided by Greater
Boston Legal Services will provide representation to incomeeligible claimants. 4 The VLP will pre-screen the cases for47
financial eligibility, as well as furnish malpractice insurance.
The project developed in response to a 48growing need for
claimant representation within the state.

Association, to Louis S. Rulli, Attorney, Community Legal Services, Philadelphia, Pa.
(Mar. 27, 1995) (on file with the University of Michigan Journalof Law Reform).
142. See Memorandum from Steven B. Scudder, Staff Counsel, American Bar
Association Center for Pro Bono, Chicago, Ill., to Monica Halas, Senior Attorney,
Greater Boston Legal Services 1-2 (Mar. 15, 1995) (listing projects that only provide
representation in employment law).
143. See, e.g., Response of Maine Volunteer Lawyers Project, supra note 141, at 2.
144. See, e.g., Letter from Mary M. Connolly, Executive Director, Volunteer
Lawyers Project, to Maida B. Shifman, Director of Customer Services, Massachusetts
Department of Employment and Training (Nov. 6, 1995) (on file with the University
of Michigan Journalof Law Reform) (confirming the need for a postponement policy
to be able to refer cases).
145. Response of Maine Volunteer Lawyers Project, supra note 141, at 4.
146. Memorandum from Diane Z. Cochran, Ellen Messing, and Christopher Perry,
Co-Chairs, Ad Hoc Pro Bono Committee, Massachusetts Bar Association (MBA) Section on Labor and Employment Law, to Members of MBA Section on Labor and
Employment Law 1 (Mar. 21, 1995) (on file with the University of MichiganJournal
of Law Reform) (announcing the program).
147. Id. at 2.
148. A Massachusetts Bar Association pro bono committee found that in Massachusetts in 1993 the percentage of unemployed receiving unemployment benefits had
fallen to 37% which, when coupled with the state's elimination of its general relief
program, had resulted in increased poverty in the state. Massachusetts Bar Ass'n,
Labor and Employment Law Section Pro Bono Proposal 1994: Claimant Representation at Administrative Unemployment Hearings 1 (Draft No. 2 1994) (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
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Representation of indigent unemployed claimants gives private attorneys an excellent opportunity to participate in pro
bono activities and to provide a real service without the necessity of an overwhelming commitment of time or other
resources.

D. Union-SponsoredPrograms

At least a few state labor federations contract with private
law firms to provide representation to union members at unemployment compensation hearings. For example, since 1979, the
Colorado AFL-CIO has contracted with a private attorney
whose office handles ten to fifteen cases a month with a ninetyfive percent success rate. The state unemployment office
cooperates by sending a copy of the entire file to the attorney
and by allowing the attorney to schedule the hearing. The labor
federation offers this service to all affiliated members and
believes that, in plant organizing drives, this service proves
very important to workers.14 9 Similarly, a private firm in
Raleigh, North Carolina represents local unions and individual
union members at all stages of unemployment hearings. In
addition, it supervises union members who act as lay advocates
at hearings. The firm combines this work with legislative
advocacy on employment issues on behalf of the North Carolina
AFL-CIO. 50 These arrangements enhance the benefits of union
membership and are also a necessary tool in assisting the state
federation to track potential policy issues.

E. Student-Run Volunteer Organizations

Among the most impressive projects in the country, and
certainly the most cost-efficient, is a volunteer organization of

149. Telephone Interviews with Jonathan Wilderman, Wilderman and Linnett,
Denver, Colo., and Ann Sutton, Secretary/Treasurer, Colorado AFL-CIO, Denver,

Colo., by Monica Halas, Senior Attorney, Greater Boston Legal Services (Mar. 13,
1995).
150. Response of Patterson, Harkavy & Lawrence, Raleigh, N.C., to NELP Survey
of Representation at Unemployment Compensation Proceedings 1 (on file with the
University of Michigan Journalof Law Reform).
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law students called the Unemployment Action Center (UAC).
A labor lawyer helped found the UAC in 1980 at New York
University School of Law in order to represent claimants in
unemployment compensation proceedings. The only organization of its kind, the UAC enlists 450 student volunteers from
four New York metropolitan area law schools. 5 1 In 1993, the
UAC conducted 475 administrative hearings and 120 appeal
board hearings, primarily on behalf of low-income clients, all
on an annual budget of less than $30,000.52
The UAC is entirely student-governed and operated. 153 Students comprise the Board of Directors, as well as recruit and
train the volunteers.154 Under New York law, law students may
represent unemployment insurance claimants without the
direct supervision of an attorney; nonetheless, the program also
155
maintains a Board of Advisors composed of local attorneys.
Although students do not receive law school credit or any other
form of remuneration for their participation in the UAC,1 6 they
volunteer readily in order to benefit from the unique exposure
to trial-like practice and direct client contact. 57 The program
has a reputation for providing high quality representation,
58
which is bolstered by extremely high success rates on appeal.1
Among the many strengths of the UAC is the large pool of
motivated and qualified advocates willing to represent significant numbers of claimants at no fee to the claimant and at
relatively minor overhead costs to the program. With law

151. Response of Unemployment Action Ctr., New York, N.Y., to NELP Survey of
Representation at Unemployment Compensation Proceedings 1, 4 (on file with the
University of Michigan Journalof Law Reform).
152. See id. at 4; see also Martin Fox, Unemployment Law Clinic Finds Time Is
Now, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 18, 1992, at 1 (noting that the UAC's participants come from
Benjamin N. Cardozo, New York University, Columbia University, and Hofstra
University law schools); Jill Kirschenbaum, Legal Aids, STUDENT LAW., Nov. 1991,
at 13, 14 (noting founder David Rafs views of the program); Pamela Mendels, The
Benefit of an Advocate: Having a Lawyer Often Makes the Difference Between Winning
and Losing Unemployment Benefits Hearings, NEW YORK NEWSDAY (Nassau and
Suffolk Edition), June 8, 1993, at 25 (describing the experience of a claimant represented by the UAC).
153. David Raff & John C. Gray, Jr., Law Student Pro Bono Award Nomination
to New York Bar Association Committee on Legal Education and Admission to the
Bar 1 (on file with the University of Michigan Journalof Law Reform) (nominating
the UAC for Pro Bono Award).
154. Id. at 2.
155. Id. at 1.
156. Id.
157. Response of Unemployment Action Ctr., supra note 151, at 1, 5.
158. Id. at 4-5.
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schools located throughout the country, and with the popularity
of clinical programs among students, significant opportunities
exist to expand the program beyond the New York metropolitan
area. Note that one drawback of the UAC, although a relatively
minor one, is the limited ability of law students to work
continuously during peak study periods and during semester
breaks. Also, if expanded, the program would have to be
modified to accommodate restrictions in states that require
representation by a licensed attorney or direct attorney supervision in unemployment compensation cases.

E. Clinical Legal Education

Corresponding with the significant expansion of clinical legal
education programs, a number of law school clinics and at least
one undergraduate program have developed an expertise in
unemployment compensation cases.' 5 9 As reflected by the
experience of the UAC students, unemployment compensation
cases are ideally suited as a teaching tool for practical legal
skills. They provide a challenging experience in a real-life
dispute. In addition, the cases do not consume too much time
and are discrete in duration. They also provide an opportunity
to test the basic advocacy skills of factual and legal preparation, presentation of testimony, cross-examination, and other
legal practice skills.
In clinical programs, students generally receive class credit
and evaluations for their participation. The unemployment
compensation cases primarily involve individual claims at the
first-level hearing stage of the appeal. Typically, the clinics

159.

See, e.g., Response of East San Jos6 Community Law Ctr., San Josd, Cal., to

NELP Survey of Representation at Unemployment Proceedings 6 (on file with the
University of Michigan Journalof Law Reform) (describing goal of preparing mostly
non-English-speaking persons for hearings); Response of Loyola University Law Ctr.,
Chicago, Ill., to NELP Survey of Representation at Unemployment Proceedings 5 (on
file with the Universityof Michigan Journalof Law Reform) (describing the Center's

services as essential to the city). At the undergraduate level, the University of Massachusetts-Boston operates the Community Advocates Law Office through the College
of Public and Community Service, focusing on unemployment and public utility cases.

Response of Community Advocates Law Office, Boston, Mass., to NELP Survey of Representation at Unemployment Proceedings 1 (on file with the University of Michigan
Journalof Law Reform).
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handle a small volume of appeals with significant supervision
and training in the preparation of the case. Thus, the emphasis
is on the educational value of the experience, resulting in an
extremely high quality of representation. As with most law
school clinical programs, the law school associated with the
clinic, grant programs of the United States Department of
Education, and the Legal Services Corporation tend to fund
these projects. 6 °
Clinical programs thus provide a valuable resource to communities. While clinical programs are limited in the volume of
cases that they handle, the resources and expertise of clinical
faculty can often extend far beyond individual cases to include
representation on appeals involving novel legal issues and
other cases having broad impact on the unemployment compensation system. In addition, as more clinical programs begin
focusing on walk-in counseling and public education, including
lay advocacy training in unemployment compensation cases,
the number of claimants that clinical programs serve will
increase. Yet, as with the UAC program, the resources of a law
school clinic tend to be limited by the availability of law
students during the academic calendar year.
F. Special Government-Funded Projects

Several state projects have developed to finance representation for claimants and small employers directly,' 6 ' with funding
generated from penalties and from interest collected on delinquent employer contributions to the state unemployment trust
funds. Additionally, a program has been proposed under which
local and state funding would go to claimant representation
with the aim of ultimately reducing overall welfare expenditures, under the theory that providing unemployment benefits
would reduce government spending on food, housing, and other
welfare benefits.

160. See, e.g., Response of East San Jos Community Law Ctr., supra note 165,
at 3 (receiving funding from the U.S. Department of Education and Santa Clara
University Law School).
161. See, e.g., MICHIGAN EMPLOYMENT SEC. COMM'N, ADVOCACY PROGRAM FOR
CLAIMANTS AND EMPLOYERS: ANNUAL REPORT 1992, at 1 (1992) (defining program
mission as providing information, consultation, and representation to members of the
employer and claimant communities).
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An example of the first model is the Illinois Legal Services
Program (LSP), which was created in 1987 to provide free legal
services by licensed attorneys to claimants and small employers unable to afford representation. 162 Illinois legislation
authorized the Department of Employment Security to request
up to one million dollars from the "special administrative
account" for claimant representation and an additional one
million dollars for small employers representation. 16 3 The
agency then advertised for public bidders and awarded contracts to providers of legal services. 164 Significantly, any
participating representative had to be licensed to practice law
as an attorney. 6 5 An appropriate level of malpractice
insurance
1 66
attorneys.
participating
the
of
required
was
In 1992, LSP representatives handled five percent of the
38,198 hearings in Illinois. 1 67 The LSP-represented claimants
received twenty-five percent more favorable decisions than
unrepresented claimants, and represented employers received
six percent fewer favorable decisions than their unrepresented
counterparts. 1 68 Satisfaction with LSP services was very
positive, except in those cases where prospective clients were
denied service. 6 9 Average hearing time increased when one or
both parties were represented at the hearing, and continuances
170
were requested and granted in a larger percentage of cases.
The South Brooklyn Legal Services Corporation B presented
the second model in a proposal to fund the Unemployment
Insurance Advocacy Project (UIAP), which is currently under
71
consideration at the New York City Department of Welfare.'
The proposal mimics the very successful Disability Advocacy
Project, which provides local and state funding for representation of applicants to the federally financed Supplemental
Security Income program in order to provide savings in welfare
expenditures greater than the cost of funding the repre-

162. GREGORYJ. RAMEL & FRANK BIESZCZAT, ILLINOIS DEP'T OF EMPLOYMENT SEC.,
THE LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM IN ILLINOIS 14 (1992).

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id. at 13.
Id. at 7-8.
Id. at 7.
Id.
ILLINOIS LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM REPORT, supra note 91, at 3-4.

168. Id. at 4.
169. Id. at 6.
170. Id. at 4.
171. Memorandum from Chip Gray, Executive Director, Brooklyn Legal Services
Corp. B, to Vinnie Montalbano, New York City Human Resources Administration 2
(May 24, 1993) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
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sentation. 172 The UIAP proposal estimates that the total
savings to New York and New York City would be at least
$3000 for each successful case. The estimation rests on a determination that the average receipt of unemployment benefits
is $200 per week over an average of five months and that the
government would save the cost of state welfare benefits for a
comparable period of time with additional savings in Medicaid
expenditures. 173 The savings is also based on an estimated
success rate on appeal when represented, offsetting the seventy
percent success rate of cases handled by the legal services prorate of cases apgrams against the twenty percent success
174
representation.
without
or
with
pealed

G. Ombudsman Proposal

The ABA has had a longstanding interest in the area of
unemployment compensation. For example, in 1989, the Labor
and Employment Law Committee turned its attention to
representation at unemployment compensation hearings because of the complexity of these hearings and the insufficient
resources available to the unemployed.' 7 5 The Committee urged
the UIS to study a proposal to create an Office of Ombudsman
similar to state-funded public defenders.7 6 The Secretary of
Labor would initially fund and run the program as a pilot
project in a select number of states.7 7 The UIS, however, has
never established such a program and rejected the pilot in 1990.178

172. See Hardin, supra note 88, at 776.
173. Memorandum from Chip Gray, supra note 171, at 4.
174. Id.
175. American Bar Association Endorses Proposalfor Reform of Unemployment
CompensationSystem, supra note 37, at A-6.
176. Id. In 1980, the National Commission on Unemployment Compensation also
specifically recommended that the Department of Labor establish a federally adminis-

tered "Claimant Advocacy Office." See Morris, supra note 21, at 666-67. The latter
proposed office would assist claimants with preparation for hearings, appoint counsel
in particularly complex cases, and accept claimants' complaints about the administration of state unemployment procedures. Id. at 666.
177. American Bar Association Endorses Proposalfor Reform of Unemployment
Compensation System, supra note 37, at A-6.
178. Letter from Mary Ann Wyrsch, Director, Unemployment Insurance Service,
Department of Labor, to Paul Wyler, Administrative Law Judge (Mar. 12, 1990) (on
file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (stating that the
Department of Labor does "not see our role as actively directing the development of
such projects from the national level"). In an interview with the Daily Labor Report
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A program such as the ABA-proposed ombudsman, in conjunction with increased claimant representation, could provide
a real service to those claimants and employers who could not
otherwise afford representation. As the ABA Labor and Employment Law Section report proposing the ombudsman
program stated:
Competent advice should be encouraged to the end that
parties do not lose cases due to ignorance of unemployment
insurance law and procedure, or due to the inability to
marshal favorable evidence. Generally, indigent, middleclass claimants and small business employers cannot afford
competent counsel or representatives ... [Slome parties
lose cases they could possibly have won if they had been
properly represented or advised by competent representa179
tives or counselors.
Echoing the ABA's concern with claimants' inadequate understanding of the unemployment insurance process, the Advisory
Council on Unemployment Compensation recently recommended that each state establish an ombudsman's office to provide
claimants or employers with information regarding eligibility
and the claims process.180
As these projects continue to expand services at a time of
significant need, additional resources for representing the
unemployed become increasingly necessary. The challenge lies
in creating, supporting, and replicating models of representation that are cost-efficient and that can serve large numbers
of the unemployed while at the same time providing quality
services responsive to the needs of claimants experiencing the
trauma of job loss.

in August 1989, Ms. Wyrsch explained that she "did not see a need for an ombudsman;" she suggested that the presence of representatives would delay the appeals
process and impinge upon the privacy rights ofclaimants and employers and that legal

representation has little effect on the outcome of an unemployment case. American
Bar AssociationEndorses Proposalfor Reform of Unemployment CompensationSystem,
supra note 37, at A-6.
179. ABA Section of Labor and Employment Law, Report to the House of Delegates
2 (Aug. 1989).
180. 1996 ACUC REPORT, supra note 34, at 13.
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CONCLUSION

Representation is vital to unemployment compensation fair
hearings, because claimants seeking unemployment benefits
face many obstacles in their endeavors to claim benefits. Most
employers have the resources to challenge successfully an exemployee's claim: they have counsel, documents, and witnesses.
Claimants, however, often do not, and must also face a loss of
livelihood that can dampen their ability to mount a successful
suit. Furthermore, despite the relative strength of the employer's position, the unemployment compensation system does
very little to aid the unrepresented claimant. The complex
system forces the claimant to participate in a typically foreign
adversary proceeding, and hearing officers do not step in
uniformly to help the claimant negotiate her way through the
confusing procedure.
Concomitantly, other factors intervene to make the unemployment compensation claimant's position even more precarious. The experience-rating system encourages employers
to oppose even meritorious unemployment compensation
claims, and third-party employer representatives make it their
business to oppose meritorious claims. Thus, even if the unemployment compensation proceeding was designed to protect the
unrepresented claimant in all cases, these other factors throw
up yet more roadblocks in the claimant's bid for unemployment
benefits.
To be sure, community-based organizations, legal services,
labor unions, private pro bono projects, and law student clinics
successfully supply a much-needed service to the unemployment compensation claimant. Yet, despite the efficacy of such
diverse programs, the representation provided is not enough.
It is time for the unemployment compensation system to
recognize the need for representation and meet the remaining
need for the purpose of ensuring fair hearings to unemployment compensation claimants.

